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HOUSEHOLDCAPITAL FORMATION
AND CREDIT
The factors responsible for the rapid expansion of the share of house-
holds in gross fixed capital formation are many and complex. The main
economic factors appear to be these: technological innovation, which
has resulted in the development of increasingly efficient capital goods
designed for the direct production of services in individual household
units(automobiles, washing machines, televisionsets,etc.);rising
incomes and declining relative prices,1 which have led to a greatly
expanded demand for the income and price elastic services of these con-
sumption-yielding capital goods; the increased value of time to the house-
wife, which has encouraged the substitution of. capital for labor in home
production; and the rapid development of capital markets in which the
financing needed to buy household capital goods could be obtained on
ever more lenient terms, resulting in a lower effective marginal cost of
borrowing.2
The objective of this section is to sketch the main outlines of the way
in which consumer capital markets have evolved, especially the market
for relatively short-term credit. Particular note is given to the behavior
'The proposition that the prices of household capital assets have declined over
time relative to the prices of consumption goods and services in general is partly
agreed-upon fact, partly my conjecture as to what adequate price indexes would
tend to show. For household appliances, it seems clear that relative prices have
in fact declined markedly; the absolute price index is very little higher in 1962
than it was in 1929, and prices of other consumption goods and services have
almost doubled. For the two most important components of the household capital
stock—houses and automobiles—there are very wide differences of opinion over
what has actually happened to prices. The standard price indexes for both assets
(BLS or CPI for automobiles, Boeckh for residential structures) show an increase
in relative price. But it can plausibly be argued that the standard indexes are
badly biased in the direction of underestimating quality change and hence over-
estimating price changes. See pp. 37—45.
2 Seebelow, where this concept is discussed.52 HOUSEHOLD CAPITAL FORMATION AND FINANCING
of credit terms other than interest or finance rates (i.e., down-payment
requirements and contract maturities), and to the proper interpretation
to be given the observed secular trend in credit terms. Finally, the degree
to which the household and enterprise sectors use borrowed funds as a
method of acquiring capital assets is investigated, and the extent of
changes over time in the relative importance of the credit market in
these two sectors is indicated.
TRENDS IN CREDIT GROWTH
The extraordinary rapid growth of consumer borrowing has been care-
fully documented in a number of studies.3 From the turn of the century
to the end of 1960, total outstanding consumer nonmortgage credit grew
from roughly half a bfflion dollars to just under $60 billion.4 Of this,
outstanding consumer instalment obligations grew from about $0.2
billion to over $40 billion. During the same time span, outstanding
mortgage indebtedness increased from about $1.5 billion to almost $125
billion. The vast bulk of the growth in short-term instalment credit,
interrupted only by the advent of World War II, dates from the middle
of the 1930's, although a period of rapid growth also took place in the
1920's. Outstanding mortgage credit had a period of rapid growth dur-
ing the 1920's, and another period of even more rapid growth after
World War II. Over the same time span, consumer stocks of durables
also grew rapidly, but the pace of credit growth has consistently tended
to outstrip that of goods. This was clearly to be expected when the con-
sumer credit industry was in the stage of structural expansion, i.e., when
large numbers of new firms entered the industry, but it has continued
to be the case even during recent years. Table 2 summarizes the estimated
dollar values of household stocks of goods and amounts of credit out-
standing, and their compound growth rates, for a number of subperiods
between the turn of the century and the early 1960's.
The data clearly indicate that the accumulation of household capital
The most recent is the six-volume study sponsored by the Federal Reserve
Board, Consumer Instalment Credit; see especially Volume I, Part I, "Growth and
Import," prepared by the Federal Reserve Staff, and the article by Ervin Miller,
"Consumer Credit and Economic Growth," in Part II, Volume I, Conference on
Regulation, published by the National Bureau (1957). Many of the basic data
have been developed by Raymond Goldsmith and presented in A Study of Saving,
Princeton University Press, 1955.
4Datafrom Table B-l, below, and Consumer Credit Statistics, Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System.HOUSEHOLD CAPITAL FORMATION AND CREDIT 53
TABLE 2
GrowthTrends for Consumer Outstanding Debt
and Stocks of Goods
End of
Stocks of Outstanding Consumer Debt a Consumer Goods
Short-Term Owner-
Long-Term,DurableOccupied
Period TotalInstalment Mortgage Goods Housing
A. AMOUNTS IN CURRENT PRICES (Shiflion)
1897 0.4 — 1.2 1.9 8.1
1916 2.0 — 3.7 10.0 20.9
1921 3.0 0.9 6,1 18.9 36.6
1929 7.1 3.5 14.2 28.4 58.6
1934 4.2 2.0 10.8 15.2 44.9
1941 9.6 6.1 13.8 28.6 60.2
1945
1961
5.7 2.5 15.0 25.0 88.7
63.5 48.0 146.7
B.COMPOUND GROWTH RATES (per cent per year)
1897-1916 +8.8 — +6.1 +9.1 +5.1
1921-1929+11.4 +18.5 +11.1 +5.2 +6.1
1929-1941
1945-1961
+2.4 +4.7 -0.2 +0.0 +0.2
+16.3 +20.3 +14.lb +11.7
1921-1941 +6.0 +10.0 +4.2 +2.1 +2.5
1897-1934
1935-1961
+6.6 +8.4 +6.1 +5.8 +4.7
+10.6 +12.5 +8.8
Source: Based on Table B-i, below; E. Miller, "Consumer Credit
and Economic Growth," in Consumer Instalment Credit, New York,
NBER, Vol. I; Consumer Credit Statistics, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, February 1963; and current issues of the
Federal Reserve Bulletin.
aHousing stock includes the value of both land and structures;
consumer durables include the Department of Commerce categories of
automobiles, appliances, furniture, and "musical instruments" (mainly
television sets at the present time).
bEnd of 1960.54 HOUSEHOLD CAPITAL FORMATION AND FINANCING
assets has been financed with borrowed funds to an increasing degree
over the period under review. Consumer debt obligations have con-
sistently grown at a faster rate than have consumer stocks of tangible
capital assets. It seems a reasonable inference that the growth of goods
stocks has been accelerated by the develoiiment of credit markets that
cater to households. And it can plausibly be argued that, along with the
increased use of consumer credit resulting from development and expan-
sion on the supply side (i.e.,. by the emergence of lending institutions)
and from changes in the social acceptability of consumer borrowing, a
major cause of the expansion in credit use has been a persistent secular
relaxation in credit terms. The analysis below suggests that the secular
relaxation in credit terms is best interpreted as a secular decline in the
effective cost of borrowing.
The development of consumer lending institutions has been detailed
elsewhere, and it is only necessary to refer briefly to such factors as the
growth of sales finance companies during the 1920's, the great expansion
of consumer lending departments in commercial banks after and
the rapid growth of credit union instalment loans during the 1950's.
Prior to World War I, roughly 80 per cent of consumer credit outstand-
ing was held directly by retail outlets that sold consumer goods. During
the 1920's, sales finance company holdings of outstanding consumer
instalment debt grew at a rate of over 30 per cent per year, and by the
end of the decade financial intermediaries (mainly commercial banks
and sales finance companies) held fully half of the greatly expanded
total of consumer instalment debt (Table 3).
Sales finance company outstandings continued to expand relative to
those of retail outlets during the 1930's, although the most striking
development during this depression decade was the huge expansion of
commercial bank participation in the consumer instalment credit market
after 1935. Legislation passed in 1935 to facilitate the financing of home
improvements permitted the federal government to guarantee up to 20
per cent of the face amount for home improvement loans; such loans
were defined broadly enough to permit inclusion of household durable
goods.° Even though subsequent legislation reduced the percentage of
For a discussion of the way in which consumer lending institutions have
developed, see R. Nugent, ConsumerCredit andEconomic Stability; New York,
1938, and Duncan McC. Hoithausen, Malcolm L. Merriam, and Roif Nugent, The
Volume of Consumer Instalment Credit, 1 929—38, New York, NBER, 1940.
6SeeJoseph D. Coppock, Government Agencies of Consumer Instalment Credit,
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TABLE 4
Outstanding instalment Credit on Consumer Durable Goods,
by MajorFinancialintermediaries
Automobile Paper Other Consumer Durables
Held by Paper Held by
CommercialSales FinanceCommercialSales Finance End of
Year Banks Companies Banks Companies
A. PERCENTAGE SHARE OF TOTAL
1924 2.1 32.1 0.6 10.0
1929 2.9 53.2 0.8 21.8
1934 8.5 77.7 1.8 13.8
1941 31.9 55.4 16.0 8.7
1945 45.9 36.0 14.0 2.9
1961 47.9 39.5 23.3 26.1
B. ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (per cent per year)
1924-29 +23.4 +27.9 +21.1 +34.0
1929-34 +5.4 —8.3 +4.2 —18.3
1934-41 +47.4 +16.2 +52.6 +4.5
1945-61 +25.8 +26.2 +22.0 +35.5
Source: All data from Consumer CreditStatistics, February 1963.
the loan guaranteed against loss and restricted the coverage to exclude
household durables, commercial bank participation in the market for
consumer instalment credit grew at an enormous rate from 1935 on.
Table 4 indicates that bank holdings of both automobile paper and other
consumer durable goods paper grew at the rate of roughly 50 per cent
per year from 1934 to 1941, and that bank holdings expanded to the
point where they were about equal to the holdings of sales finance com-
panies by the end of 1941.
Although the rapid growth of commercial banks in this field was
doubtless stimulated by the home improvement loan guarantee legisla-
tion passed in the middle 1930's, it seems clear that the legislation served
more as a catalyst than as an active ingredient in the rise." The guarantee
TOtherfactors, some favorable to an expansion of instalment credit by commer-
cial banks and others to an expansion of consumer credit in general, may be
noted: earnings from bank loan and investment portfolios had been declining andHOUSEHOLD CAPITAL FORMATION AND CREDIT 57
never applied to automobile credit, and after 1938 it did not extend to
most household appliances. Yet automobile paper grew as rapidly. as
household appliance paper during the period when the latter was
partially protected against loss while the former was not (Table 4), and
both showed an extraordinarily rapid growth relative to either direct
retail financing or sales finance company credit (Table 3). The ex-
planation seems to be that the legislation acted as a spur for many
banks,previouslyapatheticorpessimisticabout thecommercial
feasibility of consumer lending, to set up consumer loan departments.
Even after the guarantee provisions were reduced in coverage and
effectiveness, these banks apparently found that in fact their consumer
lending departments were profitable, given the prevailing level of rates
and the risks involved, and thus continued to expand their consumer
lending operations.
TREND IN RATES OF CHARGE
From the scattered data available on borrowing rates, it appears that
there has been a secular decline in rates of charge to consumers. During
the 1920's, rates on first mortgages varied between 6 and 7 per cent,
depending on the lender and the contract terms; first-mortgage rates have
rarely been above 6 per cent during the period following World War II,
and dropped to as little as 4 per cent in the late 1940's.8 Borrowing rates
on new-automobile instalment contracts were typically over 15 per cent
during the 1920's and under 12 per cent during the 1950's (Table 5).9
Very few rate data are available for other consumer credit contracts, but
there is some presumption that finance rates in other areas must have
declined also, though probably to a lesser extent than did automobile
rates. In addition, of course, eligibility requirements eased markedly
throughout the period under review: not only did contract terms such as
down payments and maturities tend to ease, but the acceptability to lend-
eligible investment opportunities were scarce; bank excess reserves were at a high
level; and consumer demand was in the process of making a rapid recovery from
the exceptionally depressed levels of 1933—34. See John M. Chapman and Asso-
ciates, Commercial Banks and Consumer instalment Credit, New York, NBER,
1940, especially Chapter 1.
8SeeLeo Grebler, David M. Blank, and Louis Winnick, Capital Formation in
Residential Real Estate: Trends and Prospects, Princeton for NBER, 1956, and
Saul B. Kiaman, The Postwar Residential Mortgage Market, Princeton for NBER,
1961.
°SeeRobert P. Shay, New-Automobile Finance Rates, 1924—62, Occasional
Paper 86, New York, NBER, 1963.TABLE 5




Life and Loan ConventionalAutomobile
InsuranceAssocja-Commercial Home Finance
YearCompaniestions Banks Mortgages Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1920 6.1 7.0 6.2 6.1 13.5
1921 6.2 7.3 6.2 6.2 14.4
1922 6.1 7.0 6.2 6.1 13.8
1923 5.9 7.0 6.2 5.9 15.1
1924 5.9 7.0 6.1 5.9 15.3
1925 5.9 6.9 6.1 5.9 14.2
1926 5.8 6.9 5.9 5.8 14.2
1927 5.9 6.8 6.1 5.9 15.2
1928 5.9 6.7 6.1 5.9 15.3
1929 6.0 6.8 6.1 6.0 15.3
1930 6.0 6.9 6.2 6.0 15.3
1931 6.0 6.6 5.8 6.0 15.0
1932 6.0 7.0 6.1 6.0 17.0
1933 5.9 6.5 6.3 5.9 17.0
1934 5.8 6.4 6.1 5.8 16.6
1935 5.5 6.2 5.6 5.5 14.4
1936 5.2 6.4 5.3 5.2 11.7
1937 5.1 6.0 5.3 5.2 11.7
1938 5.1 6.0 5.1 5.1 11.6
1939 4.9 6.0 5.0 5.0 11.6
1940 4.6 5.7 4.7 4.7 11.6
1941 4.6 5.6 4.7 4.7 11.6
1942 4.5 5.5 4.6 4.6
1943 4.5 5.6 4.7 4.5
1944 4.5 5.3 4.6 4.4
1945 4.4 5.1 4.5 4.3
1946 4.2 4.7 4.3 4.3 11.3
1947 4.0 4.7 4.4 4.3 11.3
1948 4.5 12.1
1949 4.6 11.8
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Columns 1, 2, and 3:Leo Grebler, David M. Blank, and Louis
Winnick, Capital Formation in Residential Real Estate:Trends and
Prospects, Princeton for NBER, 1956, Table 64.
Column 4:Saul B. Klaman, The Postwar Residential Real Estate
Market, Princeton for NBER, 1961, p. 287, with last six years
polated from the first mortgage interest rate component of the CPI.
Column 5:1920-23 from Robert P. Shay, "The Pricing Process in
Consumer Credit," Journal of Finance, May 1964. 1924-62 from Shay,
New-Automobile Finance Rates, 1924-62, New York, NBER, 1963,
revised data.60 HOUSEHOLD CAPITAL FORMATION AND FINANCiNG
ing institutions of whole classes of consumer borrowers must have
changed dramatically in order for these institutions (notably banks) to
have expanded their holding of consumer paper at the rate they did.
THE STRUCTURE OF CONSUMER CAPITAL MARKETS
Changes in borrowing rates on credit contracts are only one of the factors
that determine the effective cost of borrowing to consumers, and it can
be argued that market rates are one of the least important factors. In a
purely competitive capital market, borrowers can obtain any desired
amount of funds and can maintain indebtedness at any desired level, pro-
vided they are willing to pay a sufficiently high rate to cover the cost,
including the lender's estimate of the risk. In the capital markets of the
real world, business borrowers (especially large ones) are often able
to obtain funds on approximately this basis, although expansion of
external debt by a business firm sometimes requires willingness to pay
very high market rates at the margin because lenders are apt to judge
that substantial risks are involved. Thus many business firms face an
upward-sloping supply schedule of funds, based on the amounts obtain-
able from different types of lenders who charge different rates and are
willing to accept different degrees of risk—e.g., directly placed commer-
cial paper, bank loans, capital loans from banks and finance companies,
private bond placements with financial intermediaries such as insurance
companies, public bond placements with individuals or intermediaries,
long-term lease contracts, and bond placements accompanied by an
equity conversion feature. The rates at which funds can be borrowed by
business firms thus will range (as of 1963) all the way from the com-
mercial paper rate at 4 or 5percent, applicable to short-term borrow-
ing by well-established firms, to rates in excess of 10 or even 15 per cent
—the equivalent of the payments involved in a long-term lease arrange-
ment for a financially weak firm or the true cost of a bond flotation
accompanied by some equity participation. As a rule, business borrow-
ers can thus obtain funds from the capital markets of whatever amount
and for whatever length of time they desire, provided they are willing
to pay a sufficiently high rate.
In contrast, the capital market alternatives open to most households
are markedly different. The majority of consumers can borrow from the
market only when they simultaneously acquire a salable asset that canHOUSEHOLD CAPITAL FORMATION AND CREDIT 61
serve as loan collateral. While itis true that consumers can obtain
general-purpose cash loans from banks and financial intermediaries, such
loans are typically limited to small amounts and moderate maturities
except for two types of cases: some borrowers are able to obtain low
rates and lenient terms because of their strong liquid-asset and income
position or because their patronage is in some sense thought to be
valuable by the lender; other borrowers can obtain low rates and lenient
terms because they possess a sufficient amount of highly liquid assets
that serve as collateral, e.g., a savings account or a life insurance policy
with cash reserves.
The typical consumer loan negotiated for the purpose of investing in
tangible assets will involve periodic repayment of principal at the rate
that, on average, exceeds the rate of depreciation; that is, consumer
borrowers are usually forced to acquire equity in the asset.1° Thus the
typical consumer loan is accompanied by a sizable amount of what can be
regarded as equity financing. The ratio of debt to equity capital depends
on contract terms such as down payment and maturity, and on the serv-
ice life of the asset. The smaller the down payment and the longer the
contract maturity, the larger the proportion of debt capital and the
smaller the proportion of equity.
Equity financing by consumers ordinarily takes the form of the
periodic savings required by the schedule of debt repayments; since
repayments exceed the sum of interest and depreciation, equity is built
up and consumption postponed by the amount of the difference. Alter-
natively, equity financing may take the form of giving up liquid assets.
The cost of equity financing is thus either the rate of time preference, if
consumption "today" is given up to get more consumption "tOmorrow,"
or the rate of return on liquid assets.1' The latter is of course not
necessarily the same as the yield on savings deposits, since liquid assets
10 Maturities on instalment contracts are almost always less than the service life
of the asset. Even though contract maturities have lengthened considerably during
recent decades, it is rare for house first mortgages to exceed a thirty-year maturity,
for automobile loans to exceed a thirty-six-month maturity, or for loans on house-
hold durables and appliances to exceed twenty-four months. Yet houses can be
presumed to provide services for a period more like sixty or seventy years than
thirty, automobiles have an average life span of about twelve years, and household
durables and appliances have service lives ranging from five to twenty years. See
Goldsmith's estimates of average service life in Study of Saving.
11 The analysis here is based on F. Thomas Juster and Robert P. Shay, Con-
sumer Sensitivity to Finance Rates: An Empirical and Analytical investigation,
Occasional Paper 88, New York, NBER, 1964.62 HOUSEHOLD CAPITAL FORMATION AND FINANCING
held as a reserve against unforeseen contingencies may be viewed as
yielding a very high subjective rate of return.
The marginal cost of borrowing for most consumers is therefore not
the market rate of interest applicable to debt financing but the higher
nonmarket rate associated with equity borrowing. The empirical evidence
clearly shows that most consumer borrowers would prefer to use less
equity and more debt financing, given the cost of debt; otherwise they
would not consistently seek the smallest possible down payment and the
longest possible contract maturity, nor would they consistently act to
reduce down payments and extend maturities whenever lenders offer the
opportunity to do so.12 As a consequence, it can be inferred that, for
most consumers, using their own capital involves higher costs than
market borrowing. Hence consumers are typically in disequilibrium, and
the availability of credit contracts with smaller down payments or longer
maturities will be tantamount to a reduction in borrowing cost.'3
The capital market alternatives open to consumers impose constraints
that can realistically be viewed as credit rationing. In contrast to business
borrowers, consumers do not generally have a complete spectrum of
market borrowing options that involve varying rates, maturities, and
degrees of risk.'4 If a household wishes to borrow $5,000 and maintain
that debt for a ten-year period in order to alter the time shape of con-
sumption to match that of income, it will generally be unable to find a
lender willing to extend such terms.'5 Lenders will not make such
arrangements unless the household either has a very high and stable
income or marketable assets that can be pledged as collateral. The chief
12 Experimental evidence obtained from a survey of consumer preferences
suggest precisely this; for consumers classified as subject to credit rationing, the
combination of a long contract maturity and a high finance (interest) rate is
preferred to one of a short maturity and low finance rate. ibid.
13 There are clearly some classes of consumers for whom this would not be
true. For those possessing sizable liquid assets, market borrowing is likely to
involve higher cost than simply using up part of these assets, and the availability
of longer maturities or smaller down payments will be of no consequence. For
those possessing moderate liquid assets and incomes or some liquid assets and
large incomes, an equilibrium between debt and equity financing may be achievable
on the basis of the existing terms offered by lenders. However, the large majority
of consumers fit none of these categories.
The constraints faced by many new and small business enterprises are similar
to those faced by households.
Generally speaking, consumer borrowers have an option to borrow large
amounts on long-term credit contracts only when they have marketable assets:
a house in which the borrower has built up a substantial equity, a savings account,
or a life insurance policy with cash reserves.HOUSEHOLD CAPITAL FORMATION AND CREDIT 63
asset of most households—the capitalized earning power of the house-
hold head—is of course not marketable. While lenders clearly consider
the income-earning potential of the household in deciding whether or
not to extend credit, potential earnings are not usually acceptable as the
sole basis for long-term credit—presumably because proper evaluation
is difficult and because the uncertainty of distant future events carries a
heavy weight.
It can be argued that the basic distinction between households and
business enterprises in their access to the capital market lies in the fact
that the distribution of marketable net worth is quite different for house-
holds than for enterprises. Lenders are, at bottom, concerned with the
borrower's ability to repay. If the borrower has marketable assets that
will more than cover the amount of the loan, the lender's risk of loss
is minimal, since it depends on the market value of the borrower's
assets and not directly on future income or willingness to repay. For
business enterprises, almost all assets are marketable and hence can
serve either directly or indirectly as collateral. But for the vast majority
of households, the most important single asset (and for many house-
holds, the only asset) is capitalized future earnings, which can neither
be pledged as collateral nor marketed.'6 As a consequence, other things
equal, business firms can generally borrow with relative ease and with
relatively little pressure to liquidate, because the lender's potential loss
is limited by the value of the borrower's marketable assets. But house-
holds generally can obtain borrowed funds only when they simultaneously
acquire a marketable asset, and they are generally required to liquidate
the debt regularly as the market value of the asset declines.
Thus households are apt to be in a position where they can borrow
in the capital market only for periods of time that are short relative to
the service life of household capital assets, and usually only if they
acquire a specified asset that can be pledged as collateral for the loan.
Partly because of legal constraints and partly because of custom, the
market does not contain a continuous spectrum of lenders offering credit
to consumers at rates and terms associated with varying degrees of risk.
Usury laws limit the rates that can be charged on straight cash loans, and
custom sets the maximum contract maturity that will be available on
instalment loans secured by collateral. Although laws and customs have
16Theprospective earnings of business firms are obviously a marketable asset,
since this is precisely what is purchased by an investor in corporate common, stock.64 HOUSEHOLD CAPITAL FORMATION AND FINANCING
changed, lenders have never offered consumer borrowers the option of
selecting any desired maturity and paying a rate that corresponds to the
risk involved.
Capital Rationing of Consumers. The upshot is that consumer borrow-
ers have always been subject to a rather peculiar form of capital ration-
ing which tends to limit the amount of debt that can be maintained
through time. Borrowing is easy enough provided the household wishes
to purchase a new durable asset such as a house, a car, or a washing
machine, but the debt must be liquidated regularly and rapidly. Since
consumer borrowers are forced to build equity in their holdings of
durable assets, it follows that assets cannot be purchased by simply
changing the pattern of consumption. As a consequence the relevant
borrowing cost for many households is not the market rate of interest
on consumer loans, but a higher rate, consisting of either the mar-
ginal rate of time preference involved in reducing current consump-
tion by enough to meet the required repayments schedule or the
marginal rate of return on liquid assets.
This analysis implies that the cost of capital to many consumers
will be reduced either by an extension of maturities on credit contracts
or by a reduction of down-payment requirements. For those whose cost
of equity capital is higher than the market cost of debt, an extension of
maturities will, other things equal, reduce both average and marginal
capital costs by permitting a substitution of relatively cheap debt capital
for relatively expensive equity capital: longer maturities bring repay-
ments closer to the sum of interest and depreciation, thus reducing the
amount of consumption that must be forgone and also reducing the
marginal rate of time preference. Similarly, a reduction of down-payment
requirements will reduce the necessity for drawing down liquid assets
and also reduce the rate of return that must be given up.
Contract Maturities. This analysis suggests that the cost of consumer
borrowing must have declined markedly in recent decades, not only
because mortgage and finance rates are lower but because the maximum
available contract maturities have steadily lengthened. Down-payment
requirements have tended to follow much the same pattern as contract
maturities. The data summarized below in Table 6 show the movement
in average contract maturities for the major categories of household
durable assets. Since 1929, average maturities have roughly doubled for
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NOTES TO TABLE 6
Source: Columns 1, 2, and 3 from Grebler, Blank and Winnicic,
Capital Formation in Residential Real Estate, Table 67.
Columns 4 and 5 from various annual reports of the Federal Housing
Agency (FHA) or the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA): 7th
Annual Report of the FHA, Table 33, p. 68, for 1935-40 data, and 1960
Annual Report of the HHFA, Table ffl-35, p. 110, for postwar data.
1941-45 data from p. 254 of the 4th Annual Report of HHFA.
Columns 6 and 7 represent average duration of new contracts pur-
chased by one large sales finance company, and were obtained directly
from the company.
Columns 8 and 9 were computed from data in Consumer Credit Sta-
tis tics, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, February
and current issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin, using the
formula M =[240/RI—1,whereMaverage maturity in months, 0 =the
average amount outstanding during the year (beginning year plus end
year2), and R =repaymentsduring the year.
The "other consumer durable goods" series consists of total instal-
ment credit less automobile credit during 1929-39; a narrower category
(other consumer durables and appliances) is used for the period 1940-62.
for housing have lengthened even more rapidly. Except for housing, only
scattered data are available on contract terms prior to 1929, and for
housing the data are highly ambiguous because unamortized and pre-
sumablyrenewablemortgageswere commonthen.Nonetheless,
scattered pieces of evidence suggest that the trend in contract maturities
for short-term instalment debt had persisted prior to the time when
comprehensive and reliable maturity estimates became available, and
that the secular movement toward lengthening contract maturities
probably dates at least from the 1920's, when financial intermediaries
became an important part of the consumer credit market. For mortgage
debt, the trend probably dates from the mid-1930's, when the FHA
cameinto existence. If so, the most important element affecting the real
cost of consumer borrowing has been tending to move downward since
around World War I.
GROWTH OF DEBT FINANCING
The extent of the increase in consumer use of capital markets to finance
the acquisition of durable assets is strikingly illustrated by a comparison
of the household and business enterprise sectors. The relevant com-
parison contrasts the degree to which business firms have gone to the
capital markets for both debt and equity capital with the degree toHOUSEHOLD CAPITAL FORMATION AND CREDIT 69
TABLE 7
Net Change in External Liabilities for Non farm Business
Enterprises and Households, 1900-62








1901-12 19.8 1.6 0.08




























1946-49 37.6 26.7 0.71
1950-53 52.9 39.4 0.74
1954-57 61.3 51.8 0.84
1958-62 86.4 73.9 0.86
Source: Column 1, through 1949, is the sum of changes in external
liabilities, including the gross change in accounts payable, for non-
financial corporations and for nonfarm unincorporated business enter-
prises, taken from Tables 39 and 36, pp. 248 and 239, respectively, in
Simon Kuznets, Capital in the American Economy: Its Formation and
Financing, Princeton for NBER, 1961. The data in Kuznets are in turn
obtained from Raymond W. Goldsmith, Financial Intermediaries in the
American Economy since 1900, Princeton for NBER, 1958, and A Study
ofSaving in the United States, Princeton University Press, 1955. The
Goldsmith data (Saving, Table U-il have been used for the nonfarm
unincorporated sector in order to get changes for the years shown
above. For the period 1946-62 Flow of Funds estimates, including
gross change in trade debt, have been used (Flow of Funds Accounts,
1945-62, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ).
Column2 is the sum of the first differences in mortgage credit out-
standing and consumer instalment credit outstanding, respectively.
Bothseriesare from Table B-i.70 HOUSEHOLD CAPITAL FORMATION AND FINANCING
which households have used the capital market for debt financing. The
data indicate that changes in consumers' external indebtedness have
grown rapidly relative to changes in the external liabilities of business
enterprises. From not quite a tenth as large during the first decade after
the turn of the century, consumer liabilities have grown during the post-
World War II period to the point of being roughly the same size as
those of business enterprises(Table 7). The growth of consumer
borrowing relative to business was steady but unspectacular up until
1929-----from 8 to 14 to 23 per cent over periods that correspond roughly
to the first three decades of the twentieth century. But since 1935, the
growth of external liabilities in the household sector has been explosive,
relative to growth in the business sector. From 1934 to 1939, business
borrowing and equity flotations hardly changed at all, but consumer
borrowing grew appreciably. And between 1946 and 1962, the net
increase in household borrowing was four-fifths as large as the net
increase in business external liabilities; if the growth of trade debt is
excluded from the figures relating to the business sector, household
borrowing would show a slightly larger increase than business external
liabilities •17
Thesecular growth of household borrowing to finance investment in
capital assets has been striking not only in relation to the growth of
business borrowing but also in relation to the growth of household
capital assets themselves, as indicated earlier by the data on growth
rates. To an increasing degree, household capital formation has been
financed with debt rather than equity capital. As Table 8 shows, the
ratio of changes in household external debt to changes in tangible assets
has climbed steadily from less than 20 per cent in the first decade after
the turn of the century to almost 50 per cent during the period after the
'.7Alternativeways of comparing the use of capital markets by these two sectors
would probably show somewhat different results, but the main trends would be
approximately the same. The data in Table 7 represent a comparatively "net" use of
capital markets by enterprises and households. That is, repayment of external
obligations by some units in each sector are being offset against net new credit
extended to other units. However, gross increases in trade debt by business firms
are included as a capital market use because the data prior to 1946 were compiled
to include it.
If estimates with a lesser degree of netness were to be used, the levels of all
figures would rise considerably, and there would probably be a noticeable increase
in the ratio of the household to the business sector. For example, including gross
credit extensions to households rather than extensions net of repayments would
increase the estimated household use of capital markets by much more than any
comparable adjustment for the enterprise sector.HOUSEHOLD CAPITAL FORMATION AND CREDIT 71
TABLE 8










1901-12 12.4 1.6 .13
1913-22 28.1 4.7 .17
1923-29 33.8 9.8 .29
1930-33 —29.8 —5.3 .18
1934-39 15.9 4.0 .25
1946-62 443.0 191.9 .43
Source: Asset changes are the sum of changes in stocks of owner-
occupied houses and major consumer durables, derived from columns 1
and 2 of Table B-i. Debt changes are the sum of changes in mortgage
debt on owner-occupied houses and instalment debt, derived from
columns 6 and 7 of Table B-i.
Second World War.18 The upward trend is still in evidence; during the
latter part of the 1950's and the early 1960's, the ratio was in the neigh-
borhood of 60 per cent.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
To the degree that the growing share of households in aggregate capital
formation is attributable to the continued reduction in cost and the
increased availability of credit to households, itis probable that the
observed trends have not yet run their full course. Not only have con-
tract maturities on instalment credit continued to ease in recent years,
but new and cheaper methods of financing have begun to emerge. Two
such developments are worth noting. First, the availability of mortgage
rates and terms for general consumer borrowing seems to have increased
18 The estimates of tangible-asset stocks underlying the calculations in Table 8
are inclusive of capital gains or losses resulting from price changes. This factor
will cause erratic and temporary movements in the ratios for annual data, but the
time periods used here are long enough so that the figures can be thought of as
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considerably. Not only has the open-end mortgage (which permits
durables such as appliances and even cars to be financed at mortgage
interest rates and maturities) become common but renegotiation of
existing mortgages seems to be undergoing a boom in popularity. During
1963 and 1964, for example, the net new-mortgage debt written on one-
to-four-family houses was in excess of new housing construction by
almost as much as the amount of amortization on existing mortgages.
Thus consumer equity in housing has hardly increased at all during the
past several years, and there is a strong presumption that the increased
use of mortgage debt to finance non-housing outlays (education, cars,
travel, stock market speculation, etc.) is responsible.'9
It is worth noting that the existing equity in housing constitutes an
immensely large source of low-cost borrowing power that has historically
not been used much by consumers.2° In part this is probably due to
custom and habit—a typical homeowner seems to regard equity in hous-
ing as a highly ihiquid asset available for use only in extreme emergen-
cies.2' This attitude may be partly due to the high transaction costs of
mortgage negotiation, which tend to make loans based on housing equity
just as expensive as any other source of credit unless the desired loan
size is quite large.22 But if consumer reluctance to use housing equity
as a source of credit were to change, or if transaction costs were to
19 There are apparently no data available on the extent of mortgage renegotiation
or on the amount of mortgage credit extended under open-end mortgage contracts.
It is known that net new-mortgage debt has been growing at a rate that is excep-
tionally large relative to the construction of new housing. See The New Dimension
in Mortgage Debt, Technical Paper 15, New York, National Industrial Conference
Board, 1964. But this growth could be due simply to a greater turnover of existing
housing, which would tend to increase mortgage debt because a new owner
invariably takes on a larger mortgage than the previous owner had. It seems
probable that this factor is only partly responsible and that there has been a good
deal of increase in mortgage debt by present mortgagees on existing housing, but
no hard facts seem to be available.
20 In 1960, equity in owner-occupied housing amounted to over $250 billion.
See Appendix Table B-i.
21 A study by Philip A. Klein, Financial Adjustments to Unemployment, Occa-
sional Paper 93, New York, NBER, 1965, indicates that borrowing on housing
equity was comparatively rare even for households faced with prolonged unem-
ployment. Klein's data cover the period 1954—58.
22 In form, mortgage renegotiation usually consists of paying off the existing
mortgage with a new one for a larger amount, with the loan being the difference
between the old and the new mortgage less the costs. But the costs are essentially
the same as closing fees on any mortgage, and may amount to several hundred
dollars. Unless the respective borrower wants at least several thousand dollars in
credits, renegotiating an existing mortgage is not likely to be any cheaper than
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become markedly lower (as they are for those with open-end mortgages),
the structure of consumer capital markets might undergo a drastic
revision.
The other recent development worthy of note is the emergence of the
lease as an alternative to the more traditional form of credit. In essence,
a lease is a no-down-payment debt contract in which the borrower has
zero equity throughout the life of the contract. The most highly developed
lease market—that for automobiles—is apparently quite limitedat
present, since consumers who find leasing preferable to ownership tend
to be people with a business use for the vehicle.23 The implicit finance
cost of a vehicle lease tends to be slightly higher than the cost of instal-
ment financing obtained from sales finance companies—say, 13—15 per
cent as opposed to 12 per cent. The fact that a lease contract requires
no equity investment may, however, make it a cheaper source of finance
than an instalment credit contract, since the latter usually requires some
beginning equity and always requires an equity buildup over the con-
tract life. Whether leasing is cheaper or more expensive than instalment
financing depends on the cost of equity capital to consumers, that is, on
their cost of borrowing from themselves. In any event, the option to
finance by means of a lease can only make the capital markets in which
consumers borrow more, not less, perfect, and can only lead to an
increased, not a decreased, use of debt to finance consumer investment.24
23 This discussion is imprecise quantitatively owing to lack of data. There are
literally almost none, and the above analysis is based on a combination of casual
empiricism and the judgments of firms in the leasing business.
24 As a matter of form, a long-term lease appears to result in the substitution of
business for consumer debt. The lessor owns the item and thus makes the financial
arrangements for purchasing it. The bookkeeping is misleading, however. A long-
term lease agreement is really just as much a debt obligation of the lessee as an
instalment purchase contract. The lessor firm is in reality acting as an intermediary
between the lender and the lessee, except to the limited extent that risk is assumed
by the lessor.